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PROMISES, TRUST, AND CONTRACT LAW
ANTHONY J. BELLIA JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
What are the moral foundations of contract law? Most theories of
contractual obligation agree that contract law has something to do with
enforcing promises. Certainly, the Anglo-American law of contract has
something to do with enforcing promises as a descriptive matter: the most
recent Restatement essentially defines a contract as a legally enforceable
promise.' Of course promises have "gaps," and a mature law of contract must
provide appropriate default rules for filling them, but before one can answer
the question of how the law should enforce promises, one must first resolve
that it is appropriate for the law to enforce promises at all.2
Is it appropriate for the law to enforce promises? The law should enforce
some promises, most would agree. Which ones? It depends on the reason
why the law would enforce a promise. There are many theories that attempt
to explain why the law should enforce promises. While their normative
orientations vary broadly, several share a common thread. Autonomy ("will")
theories argue that to be as free as possible, a person must be able to make a
commitment? By making a promise, a person invites another to trust, and to
break a promise is to abuse that trust.4 Autonomy theories thus justify
contractual obligation on the grounds that enforcement enhances the freedom
of the promisor and respects the trust of the promisee. Preference-satisfaction
("welfare economic") theories of contract justify contractual obligation on the
ground that the enforcement of certain promises is necessary to maximize
* I thank Tricia Bellia and Cathy Kaveny for helpful comments on a prior draft of this
article, and John Finnis and John Robinson for helpful discussions.
1. Restatement (Second) of the Law of Contracts § 1 ("A contract is a promise or a set of
promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law
in some way recognizes as a duty.").
2. For the distinction between the "agreement" rules and "default" rules of contract, see
Richard Craswell, "Contract Laws, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising," Michigan
Law Review 88 (1989) 489 at 490. Cf. Joseph Raz, "Promises in Morality and Law," Harvard
Law Review 95 (1982) 916 at 932 (distinguishing the question whether "the formation of
promises [is] entirely within the control of the promisor" from the question whether "the content
of the promissory obligation [is] entirely within the control of the promisor").
3. See Charles Fried, Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981), 13.
4. Ibid., 16.
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individual "well-being," or preferences.5 Theorists in this tradition have long
argued that in order to maximize aggregate preferences, one must have some
incentive to rely on certain promises. The incentive to rely on a promise
exists only to the degree that a promise is trustworthy.6 The role of a law of
contract, it is argued, is "to protect the ability of individuals to trust promises
in circumstances in which that trust is socially beneficial. 7 Theories of
contract derived from the requirements of practical reasonableness explain
that to pursue their reasonable objectives, individuals must cooperate and
coordinate their activities with other individuals. The availability of
coordination of constructive action is thus itself a form of good.' Promising
is a uniquely appropriate means by which individuals coordinate their
activities with others.9 The practice of promising is an effective form of
cooperation only if promises are kept. Contractual obligation thus "can be
explained as the necessity of a type of means uniquely appropriate for
attaining a form of good (e.g. the standing availability of co-ordination of
constructive action) otherwise attainable only imperfectly if at all."1° "Mutual
5. This theory must be distinguished from a positive economic analysis that seeks to
determine the effects of a given legal rule. Preference-satisfaction theories of contract take the
normative position that "the purpose of contract law is to promote the well-being of the
contracting parties." Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, "Fairness v. Welfare," Harvard Law
Review 114 (2001) 961 at 1102, note 342. "Well-being" is defined with reference to what
individuals prefer: "It incorporates in a positive way everything that an individual might
value.... Similarly, an individual's well-being reflects in a negative way... anything... that
the individual might find distasteful." Ibid, 980.
6. See Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, "Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract
Law and the 'Invisible Handshake'," University of Chicago Law Review 52 (1985) 903.
7. Ibid., 905. There is a vast literature addressing what would be an efficient amount of
reliance to encourage. See Richard Craswell, "Two Economic Theories of Enforcing Promises,"
in The Theory of Contract Law, Peter Benson, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2001), 19 at 30 ("One goal of an economic analysis, then-and one focus of the recent
economic literature-is to identify those forms of enforceability that will give parties an
incentive to rely efficiently, but no further.").
8. See John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981),
154-56.
9. Ibid., 303.
10. Ibid., 325. Joseph Raz provides a similar account of contractual obligation. According
to Raz, the purpose of contract law is "to protect both the practice of undertaking voluntary
obligations and the individuals who rely on that practice." Raz, "Promises in Morality and
Law," supra, note 2, at 933. "The moral presuppositions of this conception of promising are
the desirability of special bonds between people and the desirability of special relations that are
voluntarily shaped and developed by the choice of participants." Ibid., 928. See also Joseph
Raz, The Morality of Freedom, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 173-76; Joseph Raz,
"Promises and Obligations," in Law, Morality, and Society: Essays in Honour of H.LA. Hart,
P. M. S. Hacker & J. Raz, eds. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 210.
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trustworthiness," under this theory, is "not merely a means to further distinct
ends; it is itself a valuable component of any common life.""
What is the common thread in these divergent accounts of contractual
obligation? It is that each invokes the notion of trust in explaining why it is
appropriate for the law to enforce certain promises. The need for certain
promises to be trustworthy is a reason why the law should enforce them.
Contract law fortifies trust insofar as it provides grounds for confidence that
another will perform a promise. If the law renders a certain promise
enforceable, a person may trust (have good grounds for confidence) that it will
be performed. A degree of trust in certain promises is necessary, contract
theorists say, for the realization of the goods that each asserts justifies a law
of contract.
There is an argument, however, that the enforceability of contracts
undermines the ability of individuals to realize personal trust in relationships
in which contracts are made. Dori Kimel recently has argued that to the extent
that contract law provides grounds for assurance that a promise will be
performed, it detracts from the trust that otherwise could be realized in a
human relationship. 12 He claims that the intrinsic value of a promise lies in
its propensity to enhance personal trust in relationships. Only upon
performance of a promise is a promisor proven trustworthy; thus, to fortify
trust by coercion is to diminish significantly the intrinsic value of promises
Randy Barnett has set forth a "consent theory" of contract that attempts to ground
contractual obligation in the need for a mechanism by which individuals may consensually
transfer alienable rights. See Randy E. Barnett, "A Consent Theory of Contract," Columbia
Law Review 86 (1986) 269. His theory of contract is often deemed a variation of autonomy
theory, but it offers a distinct account. Barnett's theory respects manifested "consent" insofar
as it effects transfers of morally cognizable rights. If "rights" are, in his words, "claims that
some actual legal system will recognize as valid," Randy E. Barnett, "A Law Professor's Guide
to Natural Law and Natural Rights," Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 20 (1997) 655
at 670, his theory turns not merely on the manifestation of a choice, but on the existence of a
claim/right under a justified law. The function of contract law, he explains, "is to specify
boundaries within which individuals may operate freely to pursue their respective individual
ends and thereby provide the basis for cooperative interpersonal activity." Barnett, "A Consent
Theory of Contract," at 301. As a general framework, his theory seems to have more in
common with those of Finnis and Raz than with that of Fried.
11. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, supra, note 8, at 306. Cf. Annette Baler,
"Response to Olli Lagerspetz," in Commonality and Particularity in Ethics, L. Alanen et al.,
eds. (New York: St Martin's Press, 1997) 118, at 119: "the belief that another's will toward one
is good (a belief that trust involves), 'is itself a good, not merely instrumentally but in
itself .... '
12. Dori Kimel, "Neutrality, Autonomy, and Freedom of Contract," Oxford Journal of
Legal Studies 21 (2001) 473 at 490-91.
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and to hinder personal relationships of trust from developing. 3 If he is right,
the negative effect that contractual obligation has on the development of
human relationships is significant. Are not personal relationships of trust (i.e.,
friendships) something good to be pursued? Kimel himself views personal
relationships as valuable. 14 If to fortify the trustworthiness of certain promises
by rendering them enforceable is to eliminate possibilities for trust to develop
in relationships, we could be faced with a difficult decision of legal policy.
Would we not have to weigh the benefits of enabling individuals to pursue
certain goods through promissory enforcement against the burdens that
enforcement would impose upon realizing the goods of friendship?
In this paper, I will explore the relationship between the need for a law of
contract to render certain promises trustworthy, and the trust that otherwise
inheres in personal relationships. I will begin by explaining Kimel's theory
in more detail. I will set forth the several valuable insights that his analysis
provides. I will take issue, however, with the breadth of his conclusions.
First, I will argue, the legal enforcement of promises cannot be said to detract
categorically or even typically from their ability to enhance interpersonal
relationships. In many contexts, it is the enforceability of promises that
creates possibilities for relationships of lesser trust to ripen into relationships
of greater trust. Second, the intrinsic value of a promise, whether
unenforceable or enforceable, does not lie in its capacity to reinforce
interpersonal relationships of trust. Even in relationships of "perfect" trust,
there would be a need for promises, and a law of contract that supports the
trustworthiness of the practice does not perforce degrade the trustworthiness
of the persons who employ it.
II. PROMISSORY RELATIONSHIPS AND THE VALUE OF TRUST
I begin by summarizing Kimel's claims. Kimel explains that promises and
contracts each have an instrumental and an intrinsic value.' Promises and
contracts share the same instrumental value: they facilitate and encourage
13. Ibid.
14. Indeed, he argues, they "are more valuable, or are likely to be more valuable, the greater
the freedom people enjoy and the more selective they can be in pursuing them." Ibid., 492.
15. Ibid., 489-90. Joseph Raz distinguishes the "instrumentally" valuable from the
"intrinsically" valuable as follows:
Something is instrumentally good if its value derives from the fact that it makes certain
consequences more likely, or that it can contribute to producing certain consequences.
Something is intrinsically good or valuable if it is valuable independently of the value of
its actual or probable consequences, and not on account of any consequences it can be
used to produce or to the production of which it can contribute causally.
Raz, The Morality of Freedom, supra, note 10, at 200.
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reliance and promote cooperation.1 6 In his view, however, they have different
intrinsic values. The intrinsic value of a promise, Kimel explains, lies in its
propensity to reinforce personal relationships of trust. When a promise is
made, the promisor invokes the promisee's trust. The promisee gives that
trust by taking the promise seriously or relying on it. By keeping the promise,
the promisor conveys to the promisee a message that trust and respect obtain
in their relationship. Through what he calls the "completed circle of a
promise," "messages can be conveyed and assurances can be given that trust
and its counterpart, respect-surely two of the most important building blocks
of every kind of relationship-obtain in the relationship between the promisor
and the promisee."'"
Contracts, Kimel observes, are usually made outside of the context of
ongoing personal relationships. The legal enforceability of promises provides
a "substitute source of reassurance" for parties who do not have a preexisting
trusting relationship. I" In his view, however, the enforceability of contracts
does not merely augment "personal trust as a source of confidence"; rather, it
"significantly detracts from the practice's ability to fulfil the kind of intrinsic
function that promises fulfil: that of enhancing interpersonal relationships."19
Indeed, he argues, "Enforceability," he argues, "casts a thick and all-encom-
passing veil over parties' motives and attitudes towards each other ...."'
This is not to say, in Kimel's view, that contracts lack any intrinsic value. The
intrinsic value of a contract, he explains, lies in its propensity to promote the
value of "personal detachment": the value of being able to do certain things
without having to commit to a personal relationship with others in order to do
them. "Detachment," he explains, is "valuable as an option to dependence on
(pre-existing, future) personal relationships."'"
Kimel's analysis certainly provides valuable insights. First, he recognizes
that contracts "promote a certain form of cooperation between people" and
"facilitate and encourage reliance"; and that "mutual reliance" and "co-
operation" are valuable.22 Their value is often overlooked when the debate
over whether a law of contract is justified is framed along the lines of
will/promise/contract versus reliance/harm/tort.23 As Sir Frederick Pollock
16. Kimel, supra, note 12, at 489.
17. Ibid., 490.
18. Ibid.




23. The classic work that framed the debate in these terms is Grant Gilmore, The Death of
Contract (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1974), 88 ("We may take the fact that
2002
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recognized over a century ago in his influential treatise on the Anglo-
American law of contract: "He who has given the promise is bound to him
who accepts it, not merely because he had or expressed a certain intention, but
because he so expressed himself as to entitle the other party to rely on his
acting in a certain way."'2 Kimel recognizes value not merely in giving effect
to the will of promisors or of compensating actual reliance upon promises, but
also in enabling mutual reliance and cooperation.
Second, Kimel's explanation of the value of detachment is quite
provocative. Who among us could fulfill our reasonable goals if we were left
to depend only upon those with whom we have personal relationships, or with
whom we would have to build a personal relationship? If there were no law
rendering certain promises enforceable, we would have to turn to alternative
sources of assurance that others would perform their promises. Before I
would send strangers money on their word that they would send me a product,
I would need some grounds for believing they were trustworthy. Before, say,
I would send money to Oxford University Press on the word of its agents that
they would send me the journal issue in which Kimel's article appears, I
would need some grounds for trusting that they would make good on their
word. The Press, in turn, would need some grounds for believing I am
trustworthy before sending the issue on my word that I will send money.
Contract law, in this example, enables me to pursue the objectives of
knowledge and a livelihood by providing, in Kimel's words, a "source of
reassurance" that my trading partners will perform their promises. If I have
no interest in pursuing a personal relationship with, say, Oxford University
Press, the alternative that contract law provides to dependence on other
sources of assurance is valuable.
That said, I am sure that some individuals have not only contracts with
Oxford University Press, but also personal relationships with it marked by
some degree of trust. Those who publish books or articles with the Press no
doubt have contracts with it. Does the intrinsic value of the contract lie in the
fact that it enables an author to maintain a detached relationship with the
Press? I suspect that one would enter into a contract with the Press even if the
editorial board were composed of one's closest friends, and that the value of
doing so would not be "personal detachment."
damages in contract have become indistinguishable from damages in tort as obscurely reflecting
an instinctive, almost unconscious realization that the two fields, which had been artificially set
apart, are gradually merging and becoming one.").
24. Frederick Pollock, Principles of Contract. A Treatise on the General Principles
Concerning the Validity ofAgreements in the Law of England, andAmerica (Philadelphia: The
Blackstone Publishing Co., 4th ed., 1888), 9.
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There may be value in detachment when it comes to discrete, one-time
contracts of exchange. I question, however, the value of detachment in
contracts that contemplate ongoing relationships or that govern discrete
transactions in ongoing relationships.25 In a discrete, one-time exchange
contract, if enforceability puts a damper on the personal trust that the parties
could otherwise realize in a relationship of trust, so be it. My pursuit was a
book, not a personal relationship. But in contracts that contemplate ongoing
relationships, and in contracts that represent discrete transactions in an
ongoing relationship, personal trust may matter. One might hesitate before
contracting to publish a book with a publisher whom one did not personally
trust, regardless of the legal enforceability of a publication contract. If, as
Kimel argues, enforceability diminishes opportunities for realizing trust in
interpersonal relationships, we would have to make a value judgment in
deciding whether promises should be enforced. Do we value the goods that
are to be realized through performance of the promises more than we value the
goods of friendship that the parties who make them could realize if only the
promises were unenforceable? I see no reason for legal authorities to attempt
to make any such judgments. To argue that the assurance contract law
provides that promises will be performed detracts from the trust that may be
independently realized in interpersonal relationships is to view both human
relationships and contract law from an unnecessarily constrained perspective.
I will address several problems with the argument.26
The first problem with the argument is that it presumes that promises are
made in relationships where trust exists and that contracts are made in
relationships where trust is absent. The need for a promise itself may belie the
existence of trust in a relationship. The more trusting an interpersonal
relationship, the less need there might be for the parties in it to make certain
promises. 27 Assume two dating couples. The man offers to pick up the
woman for dinner. The man in the first relationship says, "I plan to come by
and pick you up at 7:00 p.m." His date replies, "See you then." The man in
25. Ian Macneil has long professed that all contracts are "relational," and should be viewed
on a spectrum of discrete exchange relations at one pole to intertwined relations at the other.
See, e.g., Ian R. Macneil, "Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries," Northwestern
University Law Review 94 (2000) 877 at 894-95.
26. Kimel explains that his claims here are an "admittedly incomplete" account of claims
to be made in his forthcoming book, D. Kimel, From Promise to Contract: Towards a Liberal
Theory of Contract (forthcoming, Hart Publishing). Kimel, supra, note 12, at 489, note 52. As
of the writing of this paper, his book was not yet in print.
27. As Raz has observed, "[i]t is a mark of a healthy relationship that the number of explicit
promises is small and that the boundary between explicit promises and other voluntary
obligations is normally invisible." Raz, "Promises in Morality and Law," supra, note 2, at 931.
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the second relationship says, "I plan to come by and pick you up at 7:00 p.m."
His date replies, "Do you promise?" The man replies, "I promise, 7:00 p.m."
"You promise?" "Yes, I promise."" All else being equal, in which
relationship is there a greater level of interpersonal trust? In the first, the
man's mere statement of an intention to arrive at a given time sufficed for his
date. In the second, there appears to be some risk not present in the first that
necessitated the making of a promise to provide assurance that the risk would
not come to pass. The man had to promise a specific act (arrive at 7:00) to
provide assurance against some perceived preexisting risk (e.g., chronic
lateness or "standing up"). A promise can provide confidence where it
otherwise is lacking.29 If the promise is performed, prospective confidence in
the relationship may increase while prospective risk may subside, such that
next time, the man may not have to promise to arrive at a certain time. His
date will trust him to arrive at the time he says he will, or to be late only for
good reason. The point is that it may be a lack of trust that gives rise to the
need for commencing the so-called "circle of a promise"3 in the first place.
Furthermore, it is possible that a lack of trust in a relationship may be so
acute that a promise that the law will not enforce (a nudum pactum) will not
suffice to commence a "circle of trust." Only a promise that the parties know
the law will enforce might do. Like promises, contracts can provide assurance
where there is a deficiency in trust. When the couple, now engaged to be
married, asks the caterer what time it will serve dinner at the wedding
reception, an unenforceable promise may not suffice to provide the assurance
necessary for them to plan their affair. To gain the necessary assurance here,
the couple may demand the kind of promise that the law will enforce.
Promises can provide assurance through the assumption of a moral obligation
to perform, while contracts can provide assurance through the additional
28. I am distinguishing here between the mere statement of an intention to perform an act,
and a promise to perform an act. See Fried, Contract as Promise, supra, note 3, at 9
("Promising is more than just truthfully reporting my present intentions, for I may be free to
change my mind, as I am not free to break my promise."); Finnis, Natural Law and Natural
Rights, supra, note 8, at 299 ("[T]he giving of a promise is the making of a sign, a sign which
signifies the creation of an obligation, and which is knowingly made with the intention of being
taken as creative of such obligation. It is this that makes the giving of a promise distinct from
the expression of an intention to perform an action .. "); Raz, "Promises and Obligations,"
supra, note 10, at 214 (If "a man communicates to another his intention to undertake by the very
act of communication, an obligation to perform an action and confer a corresponding right on
his interlocutor, I cannot see how we can avoid regarding his act as a promise.").
29. See Annette Baier, "Trust and Antitrust," Ethics 96 (1986) 231 at 245 ("Promises are
puzzling because they seem to have the power, by verbal magic, to initiate real voluntary short-
term trusting.").
30. Kimel, supra, note 12, at 490.
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assumption of a legal obligation to perform. Assuming a legal divide between
unenforceable and enforceable promises, both may be made to enhance trust
where it is otherwise deficient to facilitate constructive action. Thus, it is not
necessarily the case that promises are appropriate where trust exists in a
relationship, and contracts are appropriate where trust is absent. Both may be
appropriate when there is a deficiency in trust.
The second problem with the claim that legal enforcement of promises
degrades interpersonal relationships is that it depends on a rigid and
unrealistic dichotomy between interpersonal relationships, on the one hand,
and detached relationships, on the other. It is true enough that the general
state of trust in a personal relationship may surpass that in a detached
relationship (especially if we define personal relationships as those that have
trust and detached relationships as those that do not). But is it helpful or
realistic to categorize our relationships in this way? Rather than draw the
divide between personal relationships and detached relationships, would it not
be more useful to view relationships on a continuum of trust?
At one end of the continuum could be relationships of perfect trust. I know
you and you know me. I am interested in and acting for your well-being, as
I know you are for mine. There is no need for you to promise that you will
arrive at 7:00 p.m. because I know that only for good reason, commensurate
with my need that you be here, would you ever arrive after the time at which
you state that you intend to arrive. At the other end of the continuum could
be relationships of no trust. All I know about you is that you say you can cater
my event-nothing else. Your promise that you will cater my event is not
good enough for me, because I need you there and have no basis for knowing
whether your word is good. At this end of the continuum, an unenforceable
promise is insufficient assurance against the risk of non-performance. Only
a promise that the law will enforce will provide sufficient trust for me to
arrange my affairs based on your word. At all points in between along the
continuum are relationships of imperfect trust. In some things, extant personal
trust may be sufficient that promises are unnecessary. In other things, trust
may be insufficient to a degree that promises are necessary to facilitate
constructive action. In still other things, trust may be insufficient to a degree
that legally enforceable promises are necessary to facilitate constructive
action.
Taking into account the complexity of human relationships, we see that the
legal enforceability of a promise does not necessarily degrade the relationship
in which it is made. The first time I visited my mechanic, I demanded a
written estimate that by law would bind him. Why? Well, frankly, I did not
trust him. I wanted a promise that the law would enforce. Today, I request no
estimate. Why? Well, now he is my friend. It was in part the assurance that
2002
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the law provided that he would make good on his promise that enabled us to
establish a more trusting interpersonal relationship. How? This leads to the
third problem with the claim that legal enforcement of promises diminishes
opportunities for personal trust to ripen in relationships in which they are
made.
The third problem with the claim is that it assumes that the legal
enforcement of promises is costless and a perfect substitute for voluntary
performance." It is neither. The law provides a source of confidence, not a
guarantee, that a promise will be performed. If a promisor breaches a
contract, the promisee does not magically receive the promised performance
or even its monetary equivalent. The promisee must bear the cost and
inconvenience of engaging the state to coerce a remedy.32 To perform even
a legally enforceable promise may be to enhance the promisee's trust in the
relationship where the promisee prefers performance to damages. By
performance, the promisor inspires confidence against the risk of future non-
performance. If a promisor has discretion in performance, the promisee bears
the risk of receiving barely adequate but legally sufficient performance.33 By
quality performance, the promisor inspires confidence against the future risk
of minimal performance. In exchange transactions, each party bears the risk
that the other will not grant a release based on unforeseen difficulties in
performance that do not rise to the level of providing a legal excuse from
performance.' By agreeing to modify rights and liabilities based on arising
circumstances, the promisor inspires confidence against the future risk of
circumstances unforeseen at the time of contracting. Each party also bears the
risk of uncertain and unforeseeable damages that may flow from a breach.35
By performing, the promisor inspires confidence against the future risk of
losses that are real but too uncertain to be recovered in law.
31. Oliver Wendell Holmes described the obligation of a contract as performance of the
promised event or the payment of damages if the promise is not performed. Oliver Wendell
Holmes, The Common Law (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1881), 301.
32. See Daniel Friedmann, "The Efficient Breach Fallacy," Journal of Legal Studies 18
(1989) 1 at 6-7 (explaining why the payment of damages for breach of contract entails
transaction costs).
33. Barely adequate performance is that which satisfies a good faith standard. See e.g.,
Omni Group, Inc. v. Seattle-First National Bank, 32 Wash. App. 22 (1982).
34. Unforeseen difficulties that arise during the course ofperformance may provide grounds
for parties to make an enforceable modification to a contract without consideration. See, e.g.,
Angel v. Murray, 113 R.I. 482 (1974).
35. Damages that are unforeseeable at the time of contracting, or that cannot be proven with
reasonable certainty, generally cannot be recovered for breach of contract. See Hadley v.
Baxendale, 9 Ex. 391 (1854).
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The argument that legal enforcement of promises degrades interpersonal
relationships accounts only for an unnecessarily restrictive view of the law.
It takes into account an external view of the law: the so-called "bad man's"
view.36 The bad man who would make promises in detached relationships
must know that he will be made to perform, or least to provide some monetary
equivalent in damages. It also views the law from the internal perspective of
the person who would use the law to keep all relationships in two categories:
interpersonal relationships of trust and detached relationships of non-trust.
That person can use contract law to keep detached relationships from
becoming interpersonal relationships, and vice versa, by making contracts in
the former, and unenforceable commitments in the latter. This person may
well be able to confine relationships to these categories, but the limitation on
relational possibilities is created by the person, not by contract law. We have
seen that contract law does enable a "circle of trust" to develop between
parties who begin from a starting point of non-trust. Should we not view
contract law from the internal perspective of those whose relationships reflect
a realistic imperfect trust, who are open to the possibility of developing and
enhancing relationships of trust (friendship), and who might use contract law
towards that end (inter alia) and not merely for protection in detached
relationships?37 The law of contract enables these persons not only to pursue
their own reasonable objectives, but to create possibilities for relationships of
lesser trust to ripen into relationships of greater trust.
How specifically may these persons use the law of contract to do so?
Parties to a relationship may form their legal obligations based on the level of
trust they have in each other. Where trust is low, the parties can enhance it by
specifying their rights and obligations in minute detail. As the law is
36. H.L.A. Hart explains the limitations of the "external" view (the bad man's perspective)
of the law as follows:
If we look at all law simply from the point of view of the persons on whom its duties are
imposed, and reduce all other aspects of it to the status of more or less elaborate
conditions in which duties fall on them, we treat as something merely subordinate,
elements which are at least as characteristic of law and as valuable to society as duty.
H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), 40. An explanation of the
law, Hart explains, must also account for the "internal" perspective on rules: the perspective of
"the group which accepts and uses them as guides to conduct." Ibid., 86.
37. This might better approximate what Finnis calls the "central case viewpoint":
the viewpoint of those who not only appeal to practical reasonableness but also are
practically reasonable, that is to say: consistent; attentive to all aspects of human
opportunity and flourishing, and aware of their limited commensurability; concerned to
remedy deficiencies and breakdowns, and aware of their roots in the various aspects of
human personality and the economic and other material conditions of social interaction.
Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, supra, note 8, at 15.
2002
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF JURISPRUDENCE
incapable of ensuring perfect performance, performance approaching
perfection enables contracting parties to build relationships of trust. As trust
builds with performance, parties may provide for more discretion in
performance, or agree to agree to certain matters as they arise. The trust that
the law initially provides allows a relationship of trust to ripen. Contract law
renders promises trustworthy, not unbreakable.
The fourth problem with the claim that the legal fortification of trust in
promises enshrouds relationships in which such promises are made is that it
sees the value of promises for relationships of trust only in their performance
and not in their making. Let us assume, contrary to what I have argued, that
performance of a legally enforceable promise cannot operate to facilitate or
enhance a relationship of trust. Our inquiry would not end there, for it is not
only performance that may enhance trust, but the very making of a promise
itself. Consider, on the one hand, the making of a promise that is legally
unenforceable, and, on the other, the making of a promise that is legally
enforceable. Assume that our dating couple has decided to enter into a
lifelong commitment. Which act of promise-making is more likely to enhance
or facilitate the trust that inheres in their relationship: I promise to love and
honor you all the days of my life, though I will not make that promise legally
binding in marriage; or, I promise to love and honor you all the days of my
life, and I am willing to make that promise binding as far as the law will
allow?
We need not rely on the unique promises of marriage to make the point.
Assume an act of promise-making that represents a commitment to an ongoing
relationship. Which of the following promises is more likely to generate trust:
I promise to employ you, friend, for three years, though I will not give you a
contract; or, I promise to employ you, friend, for three years, and here is your
three-year contract? Assume an act of promise-making that represents a
commitment to perform a discrete act in the context of an ongoing
relationship. Which of the following is more likely to generate trust: I
promise friend that next year I will sell you my cottage that you have been
pestering me to sell you for years-we'll write it up next year; or I promise
friend to sell you that cottage next year, and here are the papers-just sign?
This may apply even in the case of donative promises. In an argument similar
to that of Kimel, Melvin Eisenberg has asserted that the enforcement of
donative promises in particular is bad for personal relationships."8 But this,
38. In particular, Eisenberg has argued that the legal enforcement of donative promises
generally is not morally justified because it would degrade interpersonal relationships. In his
words, it "would never be clear to the promisee, or even the promisor, whether a donative
promise that was made in an affective spirit of love, friendship, affection, gratitude, or
comradeship, was also performed for those reasons, or instead was performed to discharge a
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too, cannot categorically be the case. Which of the following is more likely
to generate trust: I promise, friend, to give you that down payment for your
house next month, take my word for it; or, I promise, friend, to give you that
down payment for your house next month, and here is the legal form that you
can bank on, literally? A focus strictly on performance of a promise as the
trust-enhancing event rather than on the form of the promise itself is too
restrictive.
As used in contract theory, trust denotes a degree of confidence in the
promises of others. Individuals need such confidence both to pursue their own
reasonable objectives and to collaborate with others in friendship. Where
confidence is insufficient, risk may hamper coordinated activity. Making a
legally unenforceable promise can give another grounds for confidence, as can
making a legally enforceable promise. But it is a mistake to think that the
confidence provided by the legal enforceability of certain promises
categorically or even typically leaves diminished the trust that otherwise could
result from performance of an unenforceable promise. From the internal
perspective of the person who is open to the pursuit of relationships of greater
trust, the making of a legally enforceable promise can be a means for
facilitating or enhancing a relationship of interpersonal trust, as can be the
demanding of such a promise.
Ill. PROMISSORY RELATIONSHIPS AND OTHER VALUES
Now that I have argued that not only promises but contracts may operate to
reinforce personal relationships of trust, I must make clear that I do not
believe that therein lies the intrinsic value of either.
legal obligation or avoid a lawsuit." Melvin A. Eisenberg, "The Theory of Contracts," in The
Theory of Contract Law, Peter Benson, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001),
206 at 230. Eisenberg would make an exception for donative promises that comply with a legal
form for enforceability. If a promisor uses a legal form, Eisenberg explains, the promisor
"declares by his use of the form that he is moving out of the affective world of gift and into the
legal form of contract." Melvin A. Eisenberg, "he World of Contract and the World of Gift,"
California Law Review 85 (1997) 821 at 850. But is that necessarily the case? Do not legally
enforceable promises in "affective" relationships abound--to transfer real estate, to give money,
to employ? Granted, modem contract doctrine may require such promises to be supported by
consideration, but, if consideration were not necessary, some donative promises made in
affective relationships surely would be cast in the form that rendered them legally binding.
Under Eisenberg's reasoning, even enforcement of donative promises cast in the requisite form
for enforceability would have to degrade personal relationships, for, no matter the form, it still
would not be clear to the promisee whether the promise was performed in a spirit of friendship
and trust or to discharge a legal obligation and avoid a lawsuit. Ibid., at 848.
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First, individuals may make promises or contracts without intending the
legal enforceability or unenforceability of their acts. To argue that the legal
enforcement of promises either increases or decreases opportunities for trust
to develop in a relationship is to presume that individuals always intend that
their promises be legally enforceable whenever they make legally enforceable
promises. For enforceability to degrade a personal relationship by defiling the
parties' motives towards each other, the parties must, at a minimum, be aware
that their promises are enforceable. For enforceability to create opportunities
for trust to develop in relationships, the parties must, at a minimum, be aware
that their promises are enforceable. But it is not always the case that
individuals have in mind the legal enforceabilty of their promises. Persons
marrying, for example, may not intend the legal enforceability of their
promises; they may intend a moral obligation of which legal enforceability is
merely a side effect. A person may promise to rent an apartment or sell a car
to an acquaintance, or prepare a tax return for a friend, without intending a
contract, though one might in fact arise. Where individuals do not have as a
purpose that their promises be legally enforceable, or are simply unaware that
their promises are legally enforceable, the legal enforceability of their
promises cannot be said to have any certain effect on trust in the individuals'
relationship. Legal enforceability would not necessarily create opportunities
for trust to develop, nor would it necessarily diminish them. Where the law
merely happens to enforce a promise that the parties do not intend to be
legally enforceable, legal enforceability may have nothing to with trust, for
better or for worse.
Second, individuals may breach promises and contracts without intending
to do so. Contingencies may arise to prevent performance that have nothing
to do with the trustworthiness of the promisor. A promisor may be unable to
perform due to death, incapacity, or some other circumstance. Short of a
circumstance that renders performance of an enforceable promise
impracticable, the promise remains legally enforceable. Failure to perform a
promise upon the occurrence of a contingency that falls short of providing a
legal excuse from performance would not necessarily render the promisor less
trustworthy in the eyes of the promisee. Take death of the promisor, for
example. A promisor who dies before completing performance of the promise
does not close the "circle of trust." It would be strange to think, however, that
the promisor is less trustworthy for having failed to perform. There is a need
for promises to be legally enforceable upon the death of the promisor, but
enforceability cannot be justified on grounds that it enables a relationship of
trust to develop through quality performance. Nor can it be justified on
grounds that it promotes a value of detachment. The promisor and the
promisee may have been best friends and still have made a contract. What,
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then, justifies enforcement? Would there be a need for promises or contracts
in a society of individuals who had perfect trust in each other?
Suppose that our dating couple achieved a state of "perfect" trust in their
relationship. They both had full confidence in the other's good will, and both
valued the other's good as much as their own. Would that eliminate the need
for the promises of marriage? I do not think so. It is one thing to trust a friend
completely; it is another thing to make a lifelong commitment to one person
to the exclusion of others. There may be many people we deeply trust; there
is only one whom we can marry. I may value your good as much as my own,
but be unwilling to make the promises of marriage to you for good reason
(e.g., you are my mother, other obligations in my life preclude it, I have only
hours to live).
We need not rely on the unique promises of marriage to prove that promises
have value even in relationships of full friendship. Suppose I have one truck
and relationships of perfect trust with two friends who would like to use it to
move belongings on Saturday. To promise it to one, rather than to the other,
even on a coin flip, is to make a choice that is not necessitated by any lack of
trust or need for trust in my relationship with the promisee. If I am so
trustworthy with these two friends, why would I need to assume a promissory
obligation to lend one of them the truck (as opposed to stating an intent to give
it to one), and why would the friend to whom I promise it need some sort of
entitlement to delivery of the truck? Suppose that I merely state an intent to
give the truck to one friend for his use on Saturday. Before Saturday arrives,
a charity requests the use of my truck on Saturday to transport clothing to the
poor. I may be trying to promote my friend's good as much as my own and
still (or therefore) change my mind and give the truck to the poor. Now
suppose that I promise the truck to my friend. The same charity requests it.
May I still change my mind? Before I do anything, I inform my friend of the
charity's request. He proceeds to inform me for the first time that the purpose
for which he has requested the truck is to move a destitute relative who is
being evicted. If I had not promised the truck to my friend, I might act based
on what I conclude to be the "better" use for the truck in this situation. But
since I have promised it to him, his claim to the truck has priority over mine
because when I promised him the use of it I chose to limit my options in a way
that pertained not only to my future but to his as well.
This all derives from the "instrumental" value that Kimel sees in promises
and contracts. It is appropriate for the law to enforce certain promises because
it promotes mutual reliance and cooperation. The need for individuals to be
able to make reliable arrangements with one another obtains even in situations
where enforceability has nothing to do with the level of trust that exists in a
relationship. In the example I have laid out, it is conceivable that performance
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of the promise to deliver the truck to my friend in order to prove myself
trustworthy would degrade rather than reinforce trust in the relationship.
Imagine that I perform my promise to him in the face of the charity's request
because I want to close the circle of trust in order to prove myself trustworthy
in his eyes. My actions could strike him as egomaniacal and actually lessen
his trust in me.
The point is simply that even in a "society of angels" with perfect trust in
each other there would not be perfect unity of interest as individuals pursued
different forms of good. There is a need in any society for an institution that
enables individuals to be able to make reliable arrangements with each other.
And it simply cannot be asserted as a general proposition that performance of
a promise that, to meet this need, is legally enforceable degrades the trust that
otherwise would inhere in the relationship between the promisor and the
promisee.
IV. CONCLUSION
The need for individuals to be able to trust that promises will be performed
is central to justifying a law that renders certain promises enforceable. For
a law of contract to enforce certain promises to meet this need is not
necessarily to diminish the personal relationships of trust in which they are
made. Rather, the making and performance of legally enforceable promises
can assist individuals in building relationships of trust. The intrinsic value of
enforceable promises thus lies not in their ability to facilitate detachment from
personal relationships. The trustworthiness of promises is valuable to the
pursuit of myriad goods, even among friends.
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